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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TIIE STATE

or

UTAH

THI: STi\TE OF UTI\H,

Plaintiff-Respondent,
Case No. 12534-

-vISl\J\C: McDONALD,

Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE

Appellant appeals from a judgment of the District

Court, fourth Judicial District, convicting him of
burglary in the second degree.

The case has heard

befope the Honorable Allen B. Sorensen, Judge, and
a jm'y.
DISPOSITION IN 1lIE COURT BELOW

Appellant was convicted of burglary in tl1e
second degree in the District Court, Fourth Judicial

!Jistrict, on March 31, 1971.

Sentence was imposed

jor cm j_ndetermfr1ate term of not less than one year
noii more than twenty years at the Utah State Prison.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks reversal of the judgment of the
]o\'IC?P

c0l1rt as a matter of law and

Cl

dismissal of

the CJ.cti on, or, in the alternative, the granting of
a new

ial.
STATEMENT OF FACTS

Within

Cl

few days prior to the evening of

December 22, 1970, the home of Francis S. Lundell
in Benjamin, Utah, was entered and certain personal

property, including a rifle, a shotgun, and a wallet,
we1·e stolen.

(T. 25-26).

Ruth Bethers testified that the Appellant,
Carter, Joe Carter, Larry Carter, and her
furmer husband, Bill Bethers, had been in her home

at ahout noon on December 21, 1970 at which time
AppPllant was examining certain wallets which he
had in his possession.

Mrs. Bethers could remember

the colors of the wallets but was otherwise unable

2

tu jclentify them and couJc1 not remember anything

scJ·icl by the l'ippcllant or the others present with
re'.;pr>ct

to what was taken from the wallets.

(T. 8- 9) .

Elccpt for certain unclear references to a man who
: Jiad died and a truck and camper which Appellant was

to have, Mrs. Bethers couldn't recall anything
1vhicl1 Appellant had said while in her home on that

day.

(T. 10) .

Mrs. Bethers testified that she

sc-ll'.1 Appellant and the Carters at other times later

in the day.

Toward evening, the Appellant, Joe

Col'tcr and Danny Carter came to get Larry Carter
11]10

was at her home.

They were gone for approximately

minutes and returned at about 6: 30 p. m.

When they

' returned, Larry Carter brought a rifle (later identified as the one stolen f1'om the Lundell Home) into
Mrs. Bethers' home and kept it there overnight.

i
',

(T. 13) .

Mrs. Bethers saw the Appellant and the

I Carters in front of her home on the next day,
December 22, 1970.

At that time Larry Carter came

in and took the rifle from her home (T. 14) , and the
rif] e was sold to Mr. Archie Thompson.

3

Mrs. Bethers

'

1.r::-i

Lttci: jnstr'urnental in recovering the rifle

/corn Mr. Thompson.

(T.

.

Bill B2ther>s testified that he had seen Appellant
wi lh Demny and Joe Carter on December 21, 1970, and

that the l\.ppellant had tried to sell him two wallets,
a11cl that one of the wallets contained a business
1·rircl belonging to Mr. Lundell.

(T. 21) .

This

tf-'stimony of Bill Bethers was ordered stricken
frorn the r>ecord, however, because he was intoxicated

CJt the time of trial.

(T. 22-23) .

Lar1'y Carter testified that his two brothers,
Danny and Joe, and the Appellant came to get him

at the home of Ruth Bethers, where he was living,
at about S: 30 on the afternoon of December 21, 1970.
He testified that the four of them drove to the
' Lundell home where Appellant and Danny Carter got

out.

Larry Carter and Joe Carter drove uptown,

bought a carton of beer, and then returned to pick
up the Appellant and Danny Carter who had in their
possession a rifle, shotgun, and certain other probelonging to Mr. Lundell.

4

(T. 42-43).

Larry

1 r,1rt1:L' c:ic1mittecl l'c.:turning tu t11e home of !'-!rs.

Bethers

\. llh the rifle whj ch he kept there until it ,,1as sold
Llir 11cxt day.

(T.

\Vi] linm Albert CaPter testifj eel that on December

J 07 0, he \vent with the Appellant, Joe Carter,
1

;rnc1 Dimny Cc:u tcr to the Lundell residence where the
0

i\ppcl lant helped Danny Carter find Dannyt s drivers

lil·ensC?' in the yard of the Lundell residence.
l::Hli arn AJ bcrt Carte1° testified that the others
tal keel E1bout a house they had gotten into but he
1

cln' t remember specifically anything that Appellant
said and couldn t t recall whether anything was said

about Appellant being at the Lundell home earlier.
(T. 33-311).

Thoma.s R. ChI'istian, a roofing contractor, testified that on December 21 and 22, 1970, the Appellant
work eel for him on a roofing job in Provo

conm1encing

at about 9:30 in the morning and continuing until
S:OO or 6: 00 in the evening of the 21st and until

Little after 6: 00 in the evening of the 22nd.

U. 58-6 2) .

Sonja H. Sanford, the owner of the

5

)icii1. 1r1

\\'11cPc

the roofing work was performed, testified

t!t;11- she saw Appellant working at her home on both
1

1

ji 1c

2ls t and the 22nd.

(T. 66-G 7) .

!

Yvonne Medved testified that she and the Appellant

! 1,,ere living together> during the period in which the
l

! 3 JlegC'rl

burglary occurred.

(T. 56) •

On Sunday,

December 20, 1970, the Appellant spent the entire

i rloy

1·J:i th

her traveling to Salt Lake City to see

IJicr moi-her'
I

1

who was in the University Hospital.

(T. 53-

!

I '.i4).

She testified that on both the 21st and the 22nd

I

j the Appellant went to work for Mr. Chriistian, re-

l

home at around noon fop lunch, and spent

each evening with her.

(T. 54-56) .
ARGUMENT
POINT I

TI-IE STATE'S WITNESS LARRY CARTER IS AN
ACCOi'IPLICE AS A /VlATTER OF LAhl AND FACT,
AND 1HE COURT ERRED IN NOT INSTRUCTING
TI-IE JURY TI-IAT SAID LARRY CARTER WAS AN
ACCOi'1PLICE WHOSE TESTIMONY REQUIRES
CORROBORATION

6

Utah Code A11nota tecl Section 76-1trt·111

11

defines the

vr incipal TT as follows:
TTAll persons concerned in the commission of a c1"ime, either a felony or
a misdemeanor, whether they directly
comnit the act constituting the offense
or aid and abet in its commission or,
not being present, have advised and
encouraged its commission, . . . are
principals in any crime so conITTlitted. TT

An accomplice is a person who could be charged as
1

a p1 incipal with the defendant on trial.
1

Davie, 121 Utah 184, 240 P. 2d 263

(1952) .

State v.
By his

own admissions, Larry Carter was such an accomplice.

On direct examination, he testified as follows
concerning his participation in the alleged crime:

Q.

Did you have occasion to go anywhere with
Ike McDonald and your two brothers on that
day? [That day being December 21, 1971,
the date of the alleged burglary] .

A.

Yes, I did.

Q.

Where specifically did you go?

A.

We went dmvn to Mr. Lundell' s house [the
location of the alleged burglary] , and me
and Joe stayed in the car and dropped
Danny and Ike off and we went up -- back
uptown, me and Joe, and bought a carton
of beet" and went back and picked them up.

7

Q.

When they cC11ne bu.ck to your car did they
have anything with them?

fl.

Yes.

Q.

What specifically did they have?

A.

Two rifles that is laying there on the
floor and a couple of outboard motors
and LJ. television.
(T. 42-43) .

Jie then testified thLlt the rifles in evidence
wel'E' those taken from the Lundell residence.

(T.

testified that he took one of the rifles home

Jie ol

1d th him and kept it in his possession until it was

::;old the next day.

(T. 4 4) .

Larry Carterts culpability is sufficient to
place him under the rule requiring corroboration
of his testimony.

He testified that he delivered

the pat ties to the scene of the crime, picked them
1

up, an cl shared in the stolen goods.

'

Further, to the

Mrs. Betherst testimony about meetings earlier
in the clRy on December 21, 1970, between Appellant,

Larry Carter, and Larry's brothers (T. 9-12) raises
any suspicions about Appellant's involvement in the
plc:irming of the alleged crime, it raisf's the same

, suspicions about Larry Carter.
8

•

GG Utah 2G7, 241 P. 838, 839

Tn State
(J

CJ2':JJ , thj s Court quoted, with approval, the test

,,,,i 1 c11
;1

}Jy

the Calj fo1'nia Supreme Court for determin-

lio11 of

a witness is to be considered an

This, then, is the true test and
rule:
If in any crime
participation of an individual has been criminally
coPrupt he is an accomplice.
If it
has not been cPiminally corrupt he
is not an accornplice. 11
11

The test is further explained in State v. Bowman,
92 Utah 5irn, 70 P. 2cl 458, 461-62 (1937):

TTAn accomplice whose testimony
needs corroboration under the statute
is one who is culpably implicated in
the commission of the crime of which
the def enclrmt is accused. 11
(Citations
omitted)
There are many cases illustrating that a person
i','ill be deemed to be an accomplice if there is

cv:idence showing his participation in the crime.
them are:

People v. Ortiz, 25 Cal. Rpt1'. 327,

Jfi (Ct. App. 1962) where the California District
Coupt of Appeal said:

9

and is a\\1 nre
of the acts of the perpetcator' of a
crime and either> by acts of encouragement
or
or by gestures aids or encourages the cornrn.i
of t11c crime is
an aider and obetter and may be charged
as a principal. Tl
1
T

011c who is

, the Illinois Supreme Court said: ·

iJ 9, 7 22

Notwithstancli11g these rules as to the
non-liabil.i ty of a passive spectator,
it is certain thc=i.t p1 oof that a person
is present at the commission of a crime
witi1out disapproving or opposing it is
evidence from \·Jhich, in connection with
otheP circumstances, it is competent for
the jury to inf er• that he assented thereto,
lent to it his countenance and approval,
and was thcrieby aiding and abetting the
same. Tr
1
T

1

TIIe Indiana Suprieme Court in Cotton v. State,
'

I 211 N.E.2d 158, 161 (Ind. 196S) held that:

"Even if there were no active participation in the commission of the crime,
failure to oppose it at the time, companionship with others engaged therein,
and a course of conduct before and after
the offense are such circumstances as
may be considered in dete1 mining whether
aiding or Clbetting may be inferred.u
1

In State v. Olsen, 21 Utah 2d 128,

P. 2d

i07 (1968) , two \vi tnesses whose actions at the

10

;iine \\1 er>c strikingly simil;:u: to Lari1'y Curter 1 s

1

u·ccJ action in the instant case, were held to
':iv Clt!Cornpliccs whose testimony required col'roboraii on.

In the Olsen case, the accomplice-witnesses

'JelivePc:cl defendant to the scene of the crime, drove

pounc1 tovm while the burglary allegedly occurred,

0

rctt11•n eel to the scene of the er ime, picked up the

and the stolen goods and shared therein.
Tri

the instant case, accordinz to his own testimony,

i LRrry

I

Carter delivered Appellant to the scene of the

: crime, drove uptown while the burglary allegedly

nccLH'l'ed, returned to the scene of the crime, picked
Appellant and the stolen goods and shared in

them.
1

I

As with the \vi tnesses in the Olsen case, it

is di:fficul t

to find that Larry Carter was anything

' othr.r tha.n an accomplice.
This Court declared in State v. Coroles, 74 Utah
94, 277 p. 203' 205 (1929):

nwhere the facts are not in dispute,
where the acts c:tnd conduct of the witness
are admitted, then it is a matter of law
for the court to say, and to instruct the
jury, whether the witness, under the cir. an accomp 1.ice. Tl
cumstnaces, is

11

The
111 _i.cc
fliul

i<i11

whethet' Lai:1 y Carter- was an accom1

\'JilS

spccj ficc-1.lly raised by /\.ppellant in his

fo1' a directed verdict (T. 71-72) and that
\·:«-ts

consiclerccl by the trial court in its

ctcu iuJ of the motion. (T. 7 2) .

Al though the record

(1ocs not contain a request for a jury instruction
u11 LllPl'Y

Carter Ts status as an accomplice and does

nol contain Rn exception by Appellant to the instructionc:; '"'hich were given, the issue was sufficiently

in the motion for a directed verdict to presePve it for appeal.

Further formal exceptions to

the jm'y instr-uct:i ons would not have aided the trial
couPt in its determination of the issue.

It is not necessary that counsel continually
rene1·J his objections to determinations of the court.
ln Pe:__oplc> v. D:iaz, 234 P.2d 300, 304-,

(Dist. Ct.

App. 19Sl) the court said:

uwhe1'e a court has
counsel must not only
but it is his duty to
he is not required to

made its ruling,
submit thereto
accept it, and
pursue the issue.n

The case before this Court is not like State v.
22 Utah 2d 27, Li47 P. 2d 908 (1968), wherein

12

C!HIJ'

t]il

1

L- refused to grllnt reversal \11hcn c:i.ppellarrt

,,,,J nut oskcd fm:'

1

iu

Cl

jw:y instr'uction nor excepted

fu_ilm'e of the court to give instl'uction on the

le:'·' of <iccompliccs, because it 2ppe<1rs that the
2p]'f:'ll

;-rn t

jn Scott ha cl not suggested the accomplice

gue.s Li cm to the tr ia 1 court Rnd was CJ.ttempting to

on

n

ace in the holc 11 in the event of an un-

fivoralllc' jury verdict.

In the case befor'e this

C0m t the is sue was raised beJm·1.
1

Even if the motion for a directed verdict had
not prescPved the issue for appeal, courts of appeal
have reviewed errors \vi th respect to which exceptions
lr<:!VP not been made or instructions requested.

People v. Mitchell, 166 P.2d 10,

In

(1946) Justice

Traynor, speaking for the California Supreme Court
said:

[T] here is no more puPpose in
taking an exception to an appealable
ordeI' thc:m there is in taking exception
to a final judgment. The exception is
only a formal type of objection, and
there is no more formal type of objection
known to lmv than a notice of appeal from
an appealable ordor of judgment. 11
(Citations omitted)
11

•

•

•

13

;:·1
71iJ

Sti.th.:i v.

J'Rce. 187 Ore. 498, 212 P.2d 755,

CtLJ'ISl).
curn.'ts frequently review acts

and

n;Un2,.'-i of the tric:1l courts and cor-rect errors that
;11'l'

ctp1•;n'c11t on the record of the case, al though no

" cc:JJtic111s were taken thereto.

See,

Gregg v.

11 Utah 310, 40 P. 202 (1895).
The jury \·ms instructed by the teial court that
\\

1

j

lJ

Albert Carter was an accomplice whose testi-

n1ony required corroborn tion.

Failure to give similar

jnstruclions \vith respect to Larry Carter \vould have
imQlicd to the jury that Lar1 y Carter was not an
1

riccompl:ice, thett his testimony did not require
cur1'obura ti on, ancl that his testimony could be the
corro1Jorct ti_on required for the testimony of William
Albert Carter.

It is submitted that all of these

irnpliclltions are wrong and prejudicial and that
t11e trial court e1'r-ed in not instructing the jury

that Lorry Cart er was also an accomplice.

14

POINT II
'J'Jll: ;;'l'ATE' S \VITNESSES LARRY CARTER AND WILLIAM
J\1,Jl[lZT U\RTER l\RE ACCOMPLICES l\S A Ml\TTER OF
J ..i\\\1

AND J'l\C'J' \•JHOSE TESTIHONIES RD:2U IRE CORRO-

UOEATION, AND THER.E IS NO INDEPENDENT EVIDENCE

lN 1'JfE RECORD SUITICIENT TO CORROBORATE THEIR
'J'l'.STIMONIES

Appellant's motion for a directed verdict was
· J1JserJ

partially on the premise that the State had

I not

procluccc'l sufficient coJ:robm:ating evidence.

: ['I.
I

7J) .

This motj on for a directed ve1"dict is

· ad2guate to preserve the issue of sufficiency on
appeal.

State v. Somers, 97 Utah 13 2, 90 P. 2d 273

[193 9) .

Utah Code Annotated Section 77-31-18 states:
TTA convictj on slrn.11 not be had on the
testimony of an accomplice, unless he is
corroborated by other evidence, which in
and of itself and without the aid of the
testimony of the accomplice tends to connect the defendant with the commission of
the offense; and the corroboration shall
not be sufficient if it merely shows the
conmiission of the offense or the circumstances thereof.TT

lS

tl1is statutory peovision, this Couet held in

I, I

v. Lny_,

38 Utah ll!3, 110 P.

98G, 987-88

(1910),

n. • • [T] he jui_•y has no legDl right
to convict u defendant upon the uncorrobor1a tccl testimony of an accomplice, even
tliough they believe the tostimony of the
uccon1plicc to be true as to every material
fact, and are convinced by it of the guilt
of the defendant beyonu a reasonable doubt. 11

3 Utah 2d 23, 277 P. 2d 280

,,,c:
1;1 U1('

.

l«1y case, 110 P. at 988, this Court empha-

1

I
I

the fnct that corroborative evidence must do

! rno1·e than cu st geuve suspicion on the accused, or

opportunity to commit a crime, and

·
t]1at

evidence \vhich only shmvs that the defendant and

LJ1c: uccompl:Lce were seen together shortly before the
I

: roinmission of the crime is not adequate.
In StRte v. Somers, supra, this Court said:
•
•
•
ru] nless there is corroborating
evidence of a material fact tending to
connect the defendant ·with the commission
of the crime, the court should direct a
verdict for the defendant. 11 90 P. 2d at 274-.
11

l'lds

Court further held in the Somers case that while

t·roliuPative evidence may be slight and circumstantial,

11 1
-

16

a mere suspj cion of

. ; 111 1:--: I clo more th<rn

111·lt·11c1c1nl- s gu:ilt or a motive for conunit-i:i.ng the crime
1

I
I

IL 11'''('CL
l-,

1n State= v. Erwin, 101 Utoh 365, 120 P. 2d 285,
, :JrJfJ

(lrJIJ]) , this test was further explained:
11

•

•

•

[T] he corroborating evidence

rnust implicate the dcfenclant in the offense

be consistent with his guilt and inC'Ons:istent ivith h:is innocence, and must
do more than cast a grave suspicion on
him, and all of this must be without the
aid of the testimony of the accomplice.n
211d

i Sec

also, State v. Bruner, 106 Utah 49, 145 P. 2d 302

i [l q4ij) ; Stl'l te v. Gardner, 83 Utah 145, 27 P. 2d 51
!

(JLF\3) ; .§J_:at('._y__:__I:_arj s, 78 Utah 183, 2 P. 2cl

(1931) ;

supra; State v. Cox, 74 Utah ll+9,
I

271 P. 972

(1929); and State v. Butterfield, 70 Utah

I

: i29, 261 P.
I

(1927).

The tr:iul court instructed the jury that William
:Jbcpt Carter was an accomplice

(Jury Instruction 12,

i!.26), and the State macle no objection to that instruc1jo11.

That Larry Carter was also an accomplice is
j

n Point I above.

17

'J'11c only otl1c:I' \vitnessccs fm:• the State. were

i

!

I

1"·iij

l (I _i

.:' ]1i:,;

s.

s

} I (l

1
·.11 f.'(1111Jf.

1ut\'

sl 1.' i

ll been tukc11 but in no \vay even attempted

Ct Appellant with any crime)

(T. 24-30) ;

ShePiff Holley (who merely identified certain

.;Jr:iJJj t:.;)

1

Lundell (\vlio es tablishecl what property

(T. 30) ; Dill Bethers (\vhose testimony was

by the court)

(T. 23) ; and Ruth Bethers.

The testimony of Ruth Bethers is the only possible

r11Jm•ating testimony, and it is submitted that her
j

tF'sl·irnony is insufficient for that purpose.

Her

I

\ tcsiimuny, taken in its best light, may be surrunarized
I

! as follmvs:
(a) Appellant and the Carter brothers were at

her home several times on December 21, 1970.

(T. 8, 10, 12, 13) .

However, she also testi-

fiecl that Appellant and Danny and Joe Carter
came there quite frequently

(T. 10), and

that she was engaged to Larry Carter (T. 16),
such that the frequency of the visits on
December 21, 1970 may not have any significance.
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(!J) \'rli:i le in Ni's.

Bethel's T home='

011

Docernbc::e 21,

1970, Appc1l<rnl \vas in possession of bvo
w'illcts, but she \vas unl1ble to indcntify
excopt for color and she could not
remcmbe1_, unything said by Appellant or the
others \vi th respect to vJhat was taken from
the wallets.

(T. 8-9).

No wallets were

received in eviclc.:nce and the testimony of
Bill
the

about wallets was stricken from
l' ecord.

(c) \\lh:ile in Mt's. BetherTs home on December 21,
1970, Appellant said
the old boy died 11

11

it wasn't his fault

(T. 9) ,

and he also said

he was going to have a truck and campe:r which
were "down there 1'

(T. 10), but Mrs. Bethers

didn't know where

11

dmvn there 11 was.

(T. 10) .

Except for the foregoing, Mrs. Bethers couldn't
recnlJ anything which Appellant said while in
her home on thut day.

(T. 10) .

Further,

there was no evidence at the trial of anyone
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dying or any truck or carnper.• being stolen.
(cl) Tm ."cn•cl evening on December 21, 1970, Appellant
ancl Joe m1cl Du.nny Car•ter came to her home to

get Larry Carter.

(T. 12) .

The four men

returned nbout 4-5 minutes later, and Larry
Cartel' hlld a rifle with him which

later

icle11-tified as belonging to MP. Lundell.

(T. 13) .

On December 22, 19 70, she sa\-J Appellant and
Larry CurterTs brothers about noon in a car
in front of her home.

(T. 14-).

Larry Carter,

who was living at Mrs. BethersT home, removed
the rifle from her home where he had retained
it in his possession since the previous evening,
and the rifle was delivePed to Mr. Archie
Thompson.

(T. 14--15).

Mrs. Bethers later

helped recover the rifle from Mr. Thompson.
(T. 15) .

MPs. BethersT testimony does lend support to part
of Larry Carter Ts testimony such as his statements

that his brothers and the Appellant came for him at

20

I

'I
Bethr•cs

1

1

hom2 on the evening of DcccmJx;J: 21, 1970,

l tlti'L ]1c" J <-t I er returned with a rifle, that he kept the
.jf'Jc ovcr·ri:ight, and thut the following clay the rifle

1

1,c1:

rklivc1'ccl to Mr. Archie Thompson.

Ha;,v ever, to be

suflicicnt, corroboriating testimony must do more than
n1it- con !Taclj ct the

of the accomplice, it must

connect the Appellant with the co1runission of the

0 lso

c1'jmc.

:

As said in State v. Some1's, supra:

nAl though this testimony (referring
to the non-accornplice 1 s testimony) tends
to corroborate the story of the accomplice
, yet it is not corroborative of
any material fact or circumstance which
tends to connect Appellant with commission
of the crime." 90 P.2d at 274.

It is submitted that Mrs. Bethers' testimony does
'not connect Appellant with the alleged c1'ime.

At most

hel' testimony that Larry Carter brought a rifle into

hel' home fr' om a car in which Appellant was riding,

\vi th M1

1

I rifle
I

•

Lundell' s testimony identifying the

as one stolen from his property, might establish

I

opportunity to commit a er ime.

But evidence showing

mepp opportunity to commit a crime is not sufficient

con'o]J(Jration.

State v. Lay, supra.
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I

Tl1L' tc:; [·:irnony of l'l1's. Bethers might c:vcn }Je
, ,,,.: i rlr·1·( ·cl

cion on the accused.

,, ,i u
f,i'1111;
.

--

.-

.1·,
-·

-·--· --·-

<.l]Jy

State v.

St Rte v. Cox, supra· and Stnte v .
---------------

nevcro sm·: Appellant in possc=ssion

t\P:;.
:i I

But

i·cc3u.ircs that the evidence clo rnore than

l

rliL:

to cast a suspicion on the Appellant.

of

stolen property.

She coulcl not remember

nny coiwc:Psation which would link Appellant with the

(T. 10) .
; pLlL·cs,

\vi thout the testimony of the accom-

ll1r•1'c is no evidence in the record which

1.e:11cls to connect Appellant with the offense.

In considePing the testimony of Mrs. Bethers, it
is signj ficLJ.nt that Larry Cartel" was living at Mrs.
Delhc«s 1 hornc and was engaged to her.

(T. 16-42) .

The pol:i cy considerations which require the testimony
: of Lai·ry Carter to be cor11oborated might also suggest

I

that cor>Pobo1'ation come from someone other than Mrs.
ethE':'1';;, jn vie1v of the closeness of the relationship

1
[

ccn them.

In any event, it is submitted that her
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tr,
. 'I'

1·rn i1wc·L

J\ppcl lant with t1 ie com11ission of the alleged

i Ii I('.

POINT III
Tlll:

ccnmr

ORDERED TH[ TESTIMONY OF THE STATE 1 S

BILL BETHERS STRICKEN FROM THE RECORD,

Hll'f' lJIJ S ORDER AND THE COURT 1 S INSTRUCTION TO
Tlf!: ,JLJnY 1'0 IGNORE SUCH TESTHJONY WERE INSUFfJCif'.N'J' TO OVERCOl'IE TIIE PREJUDICIAL EFFECT TI-IEREOF

Bj 11 n0tl1ers 1 testimony was ordered stricken

\ :1ec·1use rie h'as intoxicated at the time of trial, and

!

jm•y \\1 as instructed as follows:
THE COURT:

nLadia-; and gentlemen of the jury,
you understand I have ordered his
testi1nony stricken.

You are to

ignore anything that he said in
court here today. 11

(T. 23) .

I

: 'ihis instruction is inadequate to protect Appellant
damage already inflicted by the testimony.

L'rnn

In Statv v. Nichols, 105 Utah 104,
(]r1ijll),

Po2d 802

jn a prosecution for bm'glary in the second
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the prosecutor attcmptec1 to introduce
linking defendant with the sale

Jiern•si:y

! 0 [ goods allegedly stolen and dividing the proceeds
I

1
:I v;itli rn1ot11e:.cr, t1"
us

court

11
ie d there wos prejudicial

I ct'ror, c-cvcn though the testimony was ordered stricken
: out.

Tl1e Cotn't obsePvecl:

TT The claml!ge was already clone by this
incompetent testimony . . . . Even had the
trial couet explained its incompetency to
the jury u.nd
them expressly to
disPegarcl it, it is doubtful that the
injurious effect could have been overcome.TT
P. 2cl at 803.

In the Nichols case there was no direct evidence
[ other than the hearsay testimony linking defendant

l

to the cLime.

(for

Similarly, in the instant case, except

the testimony of Mr. Bethers, there is no direct

I evjclence linking Appellant to the alleged crime other
than the uncorroborated testimony of accomplices.

I in

As

the Nichols case, it is likely that the jury could

\have convicted Appellant because Mr. Bethers 1 testi-

I mony convinced them that Appellant was a TT bad man 1' .
AcC'orcling to Mr. Bethers 1 testimony, Appellant was
in possession of \vallets which, by inference, could
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]1:1ve

Jwc11 the wallets taken from the home of Mr.

Lirnflcl l.

The ac1rn:i ssion of this evidence, even though later

stri.l'h:·n, ·was prejudicial to Appellant and requires

I

' peversc1l of the judgment of the tPial court.

CONCLUSION
Based upon the points set forth in this brief,
the conviction of the Appellant should be reversed

'!

I

i
I,

and this case dismissed.
Respectfully submitted,
ROBERT W. EDWARDS
Attorney for DefendantAppellant
700 El Paso Gas Building
315 East Second South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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